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purview of the statute.4 4 Such a rule would assure SEC intervention
and independent trustee's investigation for the protection of the
investing public just as these safeguards are provided today for the
protection of stockholders and secured creditors whose rights are
materially and adversely affected in an adjustment proceeding.
DOUGLAS G. EISELE

Corporations-Disposition of Corporate Assets
Where does the control by shareholders over the disposition of
corporate assets begin and the control by management end? Most
statutes give the shareholder the right of control when the sale constitutes "substantially all" the corporate assets. But the confusion
engendered over the definition of "substantially all" gives no precise
answer to the question. The final determination of consent rights
is one of policy--of balancing the shareholder's interest in protecting his investment against the director's interest in having
efficient centralized management.'
" The determination of whether a particular agreement is an investment
contract is often difficult to make. The term "investment contract" has
been defined judicially in these terms:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a

contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares
in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). A district court
has said that "the elements that make up an 'investment contract' within
the statutory definition, as distinguished from some other form of security,
are not amenable to characterization in absolute terms. Consideration must
be given to all surrounding and collateral arrangements." SEC v. Los
Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830, 888 (S.D.
Calif. 1960), modified and aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1961). For illustrative cases, see Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1963) ;
Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); Penfield
Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944).
'The primary purpose of this note is to discuss the concepts behind
one of the fundamental corporate changes: the sale, lease, or exchange of
all or substantially all the corporate assets. The focal point will be on the
right of shareholders to approve such dispositions. For related works on
this subject, see Note, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 913 (1950); Note, 9 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 269 (1958); Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1288 (1958). This note will not
discuss the procedure for obtaining shareholder consent, the value of consideration received, or fraudulent transfers of assets. For such discussion,
see Note, 58 COLUiM. L. REv. 251 (1958). The other fundamental changes
of consolidation and merger are not discussed. For a comparison of these
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At common law, the sale of all the assets of a prosperous, going
concern required unanimous shareholder consent.2 This doctrine
was based on a theory of an implied contract between the shareholders to pursue the business for which the corporation was chartered. Since a disposition of the assets would destroy the corporate
purpose, the sale could not be consumated without complete mutual
cancellation by the shareholders of their contract.3 The doctrine
also found support in a public policy against corporate suicides.4
When the corporation was insolvent, the unanimous approval rule
was relaxed to permit the directors' or a majority of shareholders'
the right to approve a sale of all the assets. Because of the restriction on the alienation of assets and because a dissenting shareholder
could demand an exorbitant price for his concurring vote,7 the
common law rules are supplanted in all states except Arizona8 by
statutes that reduce the shareholder vote requirement0 when all1 0
subjects with sale of assets, see BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 280 (rev.
ed. '1946)
[hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE].
See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921);
Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 So. 589 (1908); People v. Ballard, 134
N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892). See generally Note, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 412
(1946).
' Small v. Minneapolis Electro-Matrix Co., 45 Minn. 264, 47 N.W.
797 (1891).

See generally

BALLANTINE

§ 281; 6A

COR1'ORATIONS § 2950 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1950)

FLETCHER,

PRIVATE

[hereinafter cited as

FLETCHER].

'See People v. Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892). For a criticism
of the rule requiring unanimous shareholder approval, see Warren, Volientary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 HARv. L. REV. 335 (1916).
5 Beardstown Pearl Button Co. v. Oswald, 130 I1. App. 290 (1906).
'See, e.g., Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. 371, 93 Atl.
380 (1915); Oskaloosa Say. Bank v. Mahaska County State Bank, 205
Iowa 1351, 219 N.W. 530 (1928) (the rights of shareholders to have the
business continue becomes subordinate to creditors' rights when the corporation is insolvent).
'In the Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910).
2.01, 2.02
1See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 71-72,
(1960, Supp. 1964).
'See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Supp. 1964) (majority of
shares entitled to vote); Mica. STAT. ANN. § 21.57 (1963) (majority of
shares outstanding); W.VA. CODE § 3076 (1962) (sixty per cent of the
voting power); N.Y. Bus. CoRn'. LAW § 909 (two-thirds of shares entitled
to vote); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112 (1965) (two-thirds of shares outstanding); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 351.400 (1952) (three-fourths of
shares entitled to vote); S.D. CODE § 11.0709 (1939) (three-fourths of
shares outstanding); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 5.10 (Supp. 1964) (fourfifths of shares outstanding). (The statutes are cited in the order of increasing size of vote requirement.)
"See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Supp. 1964) (refers to all
assets sold). In Fisk v. Toys & Novelties Publishing Co., 259 Ill. App. 368
(1930), the court construed a statute referring to all the assets to include
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or substantially all' the corporate assets are sold. In addition,
thirty-five jurisdictions offer the dissenting shareholder the protection of having his stock judicially appraised and purchased by the
corporation when all or substantially all the assets are sold."2
Because the disposition does not affect the shareholder's interest
or investment, consent statutes do not apply to sales made by nonprofit corporations,' 3 and most jurisdictions do not require consent
if the corporation is insolvent. 4 The right of shareholders to approve leases,' 5 mortgages,'" and pledges" of substantially all assets
business of the corporation.
the sale of nearly all the assets terminating theN.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-112(b)
" See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW § 909(a);
(1965).
2.01, 2.02
SSee ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 73,
(1960, Supp. 1964). In the absence of statute, some courts will grant
appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders. See Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180
Mo. 1, 25-26, 79 S.W. 155, 161 (1904). But see Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A.2d 755 (1959). In the absence of fraud or
illegality, some statutes make appraisal the exclusive remedy available to dis-

senting shareholders. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 806. Where fraud

or illegality occurs, the shareholder may seek other remedies in equity.
See Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 AtI. 183
(1931); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848
(1952) (rescinding fraudulent sale). If the statute is silent as to the exclusiveness of appraisal as a remedy, courts will generally reach this result.
See, e.g., Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 46 Ohio App. 253, 188
N.E. 514 (1932). See generally Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARv. L. R~v. 233 (1931); Skoler,
Some Observations on the Scope of Appraisal Statutes, 13 Bus. LAW. 240
(1958); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 HARV. L. Ruv. 1189 (1964); Note, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 251 (1958);
Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (1959). For a criticism of the use of appraisal when assets are sold, see Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 254-57 (1962).
"8See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Barton, 195 Ark. 274, 112 S.W.2d
519 (1937): Knapp v. Supreme Commandery, U.O.G.C., 121 Tenn. 212,
118 S.W.390 (1908).
"4See, e.g., Mills v.Tiffany's, Inc., 123 Conn. 631, 198 Atl. 185 (1938)
(sale by insolvent corporation outside statute, unless business continued by
another corporation); Petition of Avard, 5 Misc. 2d 817, 144 N.Y.S.2d 204
(Sup. Ct. 1955) (sale by insolvent corporation outside the statute). See also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(b) (1) (1965), which provides that the
directors may sell without shareholder approval if the corporation is "in a
failing condition." But see Michigan Wolverine Student Co-Operative, Inc.
v. Win. Goodyear & Co., 314 Mich. 590, 22 N.W.2d 884 (1946) (dictum
that insolvency is not an exception under Michigan statute) ; In the Matter
of MacDonald, 205 App. Div. 579, 199 N.Y. Supp. 873 (1923) (dictum that
the sale of assets by insolvent corporation requires shareholder approval).
"5A lease of assets, not made in the regular course of business of the
corporation, requires shareholder consent. See, e.g., Alhambra-Shumway
Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp., 200 Cal. App. 2d 322, 19 Cal.
Reptr. 208 (1962) (lease of gold mine requiring shareholder approval).
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(b) (3) (1965). If the lease of assets is
made in the regular course of business, shareholder consent is not required.
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varies among jurisdictions. Either by statute in twenty jurisdictions"8 or by judicial construction in nearly all states,' 9 a sale of
all or substantially all assets made in the usual and regular course
of the corporate business does not require shareholder approval.20
Of the exceptions that limit the application of consent statutes,
regular course of business is the most important and troublesome.
Before the question of whether the sale is substantial can be raised,
it must be determined that the sale is outside the regular course of
the corporate business. 2 ' The purpose of the regular-course-ofSee, e.g., Sante Fe Hills Golf & Country Club v. Safehi Realty Co., 349
S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1961); Janoff v. Sheepshead Towers, Inc., 22 App. Div.
2d 950, 256 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1964) (dictum); Keating v. Coleman, 214 App.
Div. 668, 213 N.Y. Supp. 213 (1925). See generally 13 FLETcHER § 5791

(1961).

"*The trend in current statutes is to allow the board of directors to
mortgage all property without shareholder approval, unless the charter
provides otherwise. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 911; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-112(a) (1965). Thirteen jurisdictions still require shareholder
consent for mortgages. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§
71-72,
2.02 (1960, Supp. 1964). See also McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank,
70 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1934) (mortgage of all assets requires shareholder
approval); Commerce Trust Co. v. Chandler, 284 Fed. 737 (1st Cir. 1922).
Of these thirteen, eight subject mortgages to the regular course of business
exception. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-372 (1962).
" Pledges are usually subject to the same statutory provisions as
mortgages. See note 16 supra.
' ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 71-72,
2.01, 2.02 (1960,
Supp. 1964). See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909(a). Like New York,
most statutes refer to the usual and regular course of business. Compare
this approach to N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-112(b) (1965), which rejects the general "usual and regular" course of business exception. The statute sets out
three specific situations where the sale of assets does not require shareholder
approval. They are (1) sales made by a corporation in a "failing condition," (2) sales made by a corporation incorporated for the purpose of
liquidation, (3) sales made in furtherance of the business of the corporation. See generally ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATE LAW AND
PRAcTIcE § 196 (1964).
"0See, e.g., Thayer v. Valley Bank, 35 Ariz. 238, 276 Pac. 526 (1929);
Jeppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 Cal. 2d 11, 206 P.2d 847 (1949);
Bradford v. Sunset Land & Water Co., 30 Cal. App. 87, 157 Pac. 20 (1916) ;
Pollack v. Adwood Corp., 321 Mich. 93, 32 N.W.2d 62 (1948); Tuttle v.
Junior Bldg. Corp., 227 N.C. 146, 41 S.E.2d 365 (1947); Painter v. Brainard-Cedar Realty Co., 29 Ohio App. 123, 163 N.E. 57 (1928); Van Buren
v. Highway Ranch, Inc., 46 Wash. 2d 582, 283 P.2d 132 (1955); Gottschalk v. Avalon Realty Corp., 249 Wis. 78, 23 N.W.2d 606 (1946).
"0To determine if the sale is in the regular course of business, "the
test applied by courts is not the amount involved, but the nature of the
transaction, whether the sale is in the regular course of the business of the
corporation and in furtherance of the express objects of its existence, or
something outside of the normal and regular course of business." In the
Matter of Miglietta, 287 N.Y. 246, 254, 39 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1942).
"This is not always the case. Several New York decisions seem to
rely solely on the regular course of business test set forth in In the Matter
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business exception is to facilitate easy transfers by companies whose
stock in trade consists of tangible assets. 2 For example, a company
organized for and engaged in the sale of real estate 3 or in the
liquidation of assets2 need not obtain shareholder approval for the
sale of its assets. The exception enables a corporation to sell its
assets without shareholder approval if the sale is in furtherance of
the corporate business.2" However, if the corporation disposes of
part of its franchise so as to divest the corporation of one of the
powers conferred by its charter, it is not a sale in the regular course
of business.20
In applying this exception to a sale, a court must first identify
the selling corporation's regular course of business. Two approaches
have been developed for making such a determination: one based
solely upon the language of the corporate charter, and the other
upon the history and actual operations of the enterprise.28 Given
of Miglietta, supra note 20, to determine shareholders' rights. These cases
seem to grant consent rights if the sale is outside the regular course of
business without regard for the effects of the sale on the ability of the
corporation to carry on its operations. See In the Matter of Kunin, 281
App. Div. 635, 121 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1953), aff'd tern., 306 N.Y. 967, 120
N.E.2d 228 (1954).
2" See Thayer v. Valley Bank, 35 Ariz. 238, 276 Pac. 526 (1929).
" See, e.g., Eisen v. Post, 3 N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779, 169 N.Y.S.2d
15 (1957), 67 YALE L.J. 1288 (1958) ; In the Matter of Rosenshein, 16 App.
Div. 2d 537, 229 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1962); Tuttle v. Junior Bldg. Corp., 227
N.C. 146, 41 S.E.2d 365 (1947). But see Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Ave. &
Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (consent required if real estate corporation sells its sole asset) ; Borea v. Locust Court
Apartments, Inc., 234 App. Div. 450, 255 N.Y. Supp. 215 (1932).
" See, e.g., Jeppi v. Brochman Holding Co., 34 Cal. 2d 11, 206 P.2d
847 (1949); Roehner v. Gracie Manor, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 280, 160 N.E.2d
519, 189 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1959); In the Matter of Miglietta, 289 N.Y. 246,
39 N.E.2d 224 (1942). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(b) (2) (1965).
2 See Murphy v. Washington American
League Base Ball Club, Inc.,
293 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Petition of Hake, 285 App. Div. 316, 136
N.Y.S.2d 817 (1955); Petition of Avard, 5 Misc. 2d 817, 144 N.Y.S.2d
204 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
.8In the Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910).
27 See it re United Gas Corp., 58 F. Supp. 501 (D. Del. 1944); Sewell
v. East Cape May Beach Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 717, 25 At1. 929 (Ch. 1893);
Eisen v. Post, 3 N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779, 169 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1957);
In the Matter of Rosenshein, 16 App. Div. 2d 537, 229 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1962) ;
Wattley v. National Drug Stores Corp., 122 Misc. 533, 204 N.Y. Supp. 254
(Sup. Ct.) (dictum), aff'd, 208 App. Div. 836, 204 N.Y. Supp. 956 (1929).
2 See Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) ; In the Matter of Kunin, 281 App. Div. 635, 121 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1953),
aff'd mere., 306 N.Y. 967, 120 N.E.2d 228 (1954); Kaszubowski v. Buffalo
Tel. Corp., 131 Misc. 563, 227 N.Y. Supp. 435 (Sup. Ct 1928). The new
N.Y. Bus. Cornu. LAw § 909(a) now follows this approach, overruling the
decision of Eisen v. Post, mpra note 27. For a case interpreting this pro-
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the predominance of multipurpose charters 2 and broad powers
granted corporations under statute,30 the charter approach is an
inaccurate means of ascertaining the business of the corporation. 8 '
On the other hand, the actual-operations approach affords the shareholder realistic protection because his investment is based not on
what the charter says the corporation may do, but on what the
corporation actually does. And, assuming the shareholder's investment is based on actual operations, a sale held to be in the regular
course of business within the charter provisions could substantially
change his investment without granting him adequate protection.
When the corporation contemplates a continued existence, the
sale of all or substantially all the assets in the regular course of
business should necessarily be under the control of the board of
directors, as a part of their duty to carry on the corporate business.
But the exception should not be used to evade shareholder consent
and appraisal rights if the financially sound corporation anticipates
eventual liquidation. Unfortunately, some courts have often ignored the ultimate purpose of the sale, and have only looked to the
2
present effect of the sale upon the shareholder's interests .
Once the sale is considered outside the regular course of business, it is necessary to decide if the particular sale involves substantially all the assets. The problem arises in determining the
meaning of "substantially all." 33 An examination of the common
law rules and subsequent statutory history indicates that the purpose of most consent statutes is to protect the shareholder from
vision of the statute, see Boyer v. Legal Estates, Inc., 2 CHH CoRP.

LAw

GuIDE
10935 (152 N.Y.L.J. 15, 1964).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-02, 121-22 (1953, Supp. 1964).
See, e.g., statutory sections cited in note 29 supra.
"1 As said by Lord Wrenbury in Cotman v. Brougham, [1918] A.C.
514, 523, the function of the charter is "not to disclose, but to bury
beneath a mass of words the real object or objects of the company with the
intent that every conceivable form of activity shall be found included somewhere within its terms." See BALLANTINE § 82.
2See Eisen v. Post, 3 N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779, 169 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1957) (sale of the corporation's only asset virtually ending corporate existence held to be in regular course of business). But see Starrett Corp.
v. Fifth Ave. & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932)
(sale by real estate corporation of its only asset requires shareholder consent). See generally ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRAcTIcE 286 (1963).
3
It should be noted that most of the litigation concerning this question
involves appraisal rights granted to the dissenting shareholder. Most consent and appraisal statutes have identical requirements that the sale must
meet before shareholder's rights are granted. Compare N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAw § 909(a) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1)(B).
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fundamental change, or more specifically, to protect the shareholder
from the destruction of the means to accomplish the purposes or
objects for which the corporation was incorporated and actually
performs. 4 Obviously, a sale of all the assets would destroy the
corporate business. The same result could be reached if less than
all the assets are sold. The words "substantially all" seem designed
to cover such situations. For example, in Stiles v. Aluminum
Products Co.,35 the manufacturer of aluminum and stainless steel
cooking utensils sold its plant, machinery, and goodwill for 1,406,570
dollars. The corporation retained a realty company, accounts receivables, securities, and an old car, all valued at 760,622.69 dollars.
The court held that the sale was of substantially all the assets under
the applicable Illinois statute.3 6 Though the sale amounted to only
64.7 per cent of the total assets and could not literally be considered
substantially all, the sale did destroy what was ostensibly the corporation's business; therefore, the sale had the effect of a sale of all the
37

assets.

In contrast, New York seems to have broadened the ambit of the
shareholder's rights. Under the former Stock Corporation Law,3
the shareholder was afforded protection where the assets sold were
an "integral part thereof essential to the conduct of the business of
the corporation." 3 For example, a sale of part of the assets and
franchise, no matter how small, was considered to be the sale of
an integral part of the corporate business even if the sale did not
destroy the ability of the corporation to continue operations.4 Also,
" See 2 FLETCHER § 546 (1954).
" 338 Ill. App. 48, 86 N.E.2d 887 (1949).
" ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.73 (1954) (appraisal statute).

" For cases reaching the same conclusion, see Fisk v. Toys & Novelties
App. 368 (1930); Prince George's Country Club v.
Publishing Co., 259 Ill.
Edward R. Carr, Inc., 235 Md. 591, 202 A.2d 354 (1964). Cf. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank v. B. S. F. Co., 199 A.2d 557 (Del. Ch.), rev'd on other grounds,
204 A.2d 746 (Del. 1964). But see Krell v. Krell Piano Co., 23 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 193, aff'd, 14 Ohio App. 74 (1921). For cases concluding the
sale was less than substantially all, see Klopot v. Northrup, 131 Conn. 14, 37
A.2d 700 (1944); Frankel v. Tremont Norman Motors Corp., 21 Misc.
2d 20, 193 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 10 App. Div. 2d 680,
197 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1960), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 901, 168 N.E.2d 823, 204 N.Y.S.2d
146 (1960); Fontaine v. Brown Country Motors Co., 251 Wis. 433, 29
N.W.2d 744 (1937).
N.Y. STocK CoRi'. LAW § 20.

" Ibid. See Petitions of McKay, 19 App. Div. 2d 815, 243 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1963) (sale of assets accounting for seven percent of gross revenues
held to be within § 20); In the Matter of Kunin, 281 App. Div. 635, 121
220 (1953) (sale of one-fourth assets held to be within § 20).
N.Y.S.2d
"0See In the Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910);
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if the disposition affected the shareholder's investment, protection
was granted regardless of the size of the sale. 1 The new Business
Corporation Law has replaced the integral concept and relies solely
on the words "all or substantially all."' 42 This change would appear
to drastically limit the protection formerly bestowed the share43
holder, though some commentators think not.
The use of broad consent statutes, similar to the Stock Corporation Law, affords the shareholder more protection because such
statutes do not limit protection to an implied quantity such as substantially all. But there are certain inherent practical disadvantages
to the use of a broad consent statute. The board of directors are
often unable to predict when or when not to call for a shareholder
vote." Because of the diffusion of shareholders throughout the
country and the necessity for fast transfers, a shareholder vote
cannot always be called to remedy the uncertainty. Until a judicial
determination is made, neither the directors nor the purchaser
know if the sale is a valid transaction. To avoid this predicament,
it is suggested that a single standard, as implied in Stiles, be adopted.
Because it would be easy to determine if a sale prevents the corporation from carrying out its business, 45 the directors would be
able to predict the need for a shareholder vote; shareholder litigation, caused by uncertainty as to how far courts will go, would be
reduced;" and the purchaser would be protected from having the
Kaszubowski v. Buffalo Tel. Corp., 131 Misc. 563, 227 N.Y. Supp. 435
(Sup. Ct. 1928). It is questionable whether a sale including franchise
affects the corporation's operations any more than a sale without the
franchise. See Manning, supra note 12.
4" See In the Matter of Kunin, 281 App. Div. 635, 121 N.Y.S.2d 220
(1953) (distribution to shareholders of stock of buying corporation);
Borea v. Locust Court Apartments, 234 App. Div. 450, 255 N.Y. Supp. 215
(1932); In the Matter of Drosnes, 187 App. Div. 425, 175 N.Y. Supp. 628
(1919).
"'N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909(a).
"Comment, 11 BUF. L. REv. 615, 649 (1962).
"Manning, supra note 12, at 255 n.55.
"If the corporation is multipurpose and the sale involves one segment
of the multipurpose, some confusion may arise as to the rights of shareholders under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(b) (3) (1965), which refers only
to "the business in which the corporation was organized to engage ....
(Emphasis added.) See RoBiNsON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 199 (1964). Under most statutes, the problem of the
multipurpose corporation would be covered because they refer to the "11suat"
business of the corporation. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909(a).
" It is interesting to note that most litigation in the area of consent
rights has arisen under the N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 20 (1954), which is
a very broad statute.
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sale declared invalid. The adoption of such an arbitrary limitation
on consent rights may seem to sacrifice the shareholder's interests
for the goals of uniformity and predictability, but it is suggested
that the shareholder sacrifices his interests when he delegates to the
directors the duty to carry out the corporate purposes.4 7 Any decision to sell assets that does not destroy the ability of the directors
to carry on the corporate business should necessarily be within the
business discretion of the directors, absent fraud,4" and such a
decision should not be subject to approval because the shareholder
dislikes it or suffers by it.
If a sale of all or substantially all the assets is made without the
required consent, the shareholder may bring an action to rescind4 9
or enjoin5" the sale, or his sole remedy may be appraisal, depending
on the law of his jurisdiction.5 1 Because the consent statutes are for
the benefit of the shareholder,5 2 only he has the right to attack the
sale made without consent. If the sale is attacked, it is considered
voidable rather than void ;54 therefore, subsequent approval can rectify
the situation. Furthermore, the shareholder's attack may be barred
by the defense of estoppe5 5 and laches.58
'7 See 5 FLETCHER § 2097 (1952).
" See, e.g., Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193,
126 At. 46 (1924). See generally Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931).
" See Kaszubowski v. Buffalo Tel. Corp., 131 Misc. 563, 227 N.Y. Supp.
435 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
" See Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Ave. & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., 1 F. Supp.
868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
' See note 12 supra.
See, e.g., Foss v. Riordan, 84 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd,
273 App. Div. 982, 79 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1948).
" See, e.g., ibid. Those who may not assert the invalidity of a sale
because of the failure of consent are: (1) Creditors of the corporation.
See, e.g., Long Constr. Co. v. Empire Drive-In Theatres, Inc., 208 Cal.
App. 2d 726, 25 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1962); but see In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d
555 (2d Cir. 1929) (trust receipts covering automobiles). (2) Receivers
in insolvency for the corporation. See, e.g., Manhattan Hardware Co. v.
Phalen, 128 Pa. 110, 18 AtI. 428 (1889); but see Glover v. Ehrlich, 62
Misc. 245, 114 N.Y. Supp. 992 (Sup. Ct. 1909). (3) Trustee in bankruptcy
or assignee of creditors of the corporation. See, e.g., United States v.
Jones, 229 F.2d 84 (10th Cir. 1955); but see Shapiro v. People's Co-Op.
Soc., 125 Misc. 839, 211 N.Y. Supp. 468 (App. Div. 1929). (4) The
corporation. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp.
106 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); but see In re Paul De Laney Co., 26 F.2d 961 (2d
Cir. 1928) (recognized the possibility).
" See, e.g., Long Constr. Co. v. Empire Drive-In Theatres, Inc., 208
Cal. App. 2d 726, 25 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1962); Schneider v. Greater M. & S.
Circuit, Inc., 144 Misc. 534, 259 N.Y. Supp. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
"'Armstrong Manors v. Burris, 193 Cal. App. 2d 447, 14 Cal. Rptr.
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Fortunately, litigation involving failure to obtain the necessary
consent is rare. As a matter of policy, many corporations ask for
shareholder approval when an important disposition is made, regardless of whether consent is required. Obviously, this policy is
desirable, and the fact that consent is granted does not affect a
subsequent claim for appraisal rights. Unfortunately, shareholder
approval is not always possible. In such situations, the directors
should have the power to make necessary dispositions, unless the
sale, not in the furtherance of the actual business of the corporation, destroys the corporation's ability to continue its present operations. Such an approach reaches the desired practical balance between protecting the shareholder's investment and having an efficient centralized management.
RIcHARD G. ELLIOTT, JR.
Credit Transactions-Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Application of
Statute of Limitations to Promise of Assuming Grantee
Debtors gave notes secured by deeds of trust on certain realty.
Seven years thereafter, during which period no payments of either
principal or interest had been made on the obligations, the equity
of redemption in the land was conveyed to grantee who thereupon
executed an instrument acknowledging that the land was encumbered by the deeds of trust, that no payments had been made to date,
and further that he agreed "to pay the full sum of both notes .. .
together with all accrued interest thereon."' This instrument was
attached to the notes and deeds of trust found among the valuable
papers of the creditor after his death. Five years after the conveyance to the grantee, there still having been no payments on the
obligations, the defendant trustee attempted to exercise the power of
sale contained in the first of the deeds of trust, and this action was
instituted by debtors and their grantee to restrain such foreclosure.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Lowe v. Jackson,2 affirmed
the trial court's judgment granting the injunction. The grantee's
338 (1961); Garvin v. Pythian Mut. Industrial Ass'n, 263 S.W.2d 114
(Ky. 1953) (lapse of fourteen years).
Alhambra-Shumway Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp., 200
Cal. App. 2d 322, 19 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1962); Elster v. American Airlines,
Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 213, 128 A.2d 801 (1957).
1 Lowe

v. Jackson, 263 N.C. 634, 635, 140 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1965).

2263 N.C. 634, 140 S.E.2d 1 (1965).

